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This study investigates the growth of Finnish deposit banks over the period
1980-1993. We examine the growth in balance sheets, lending and depasits af
the publie as well as major changes in the balance sheet structure. The focus of
the study is first on the overall banking industry and second on the commercial,
savings and caoperative banks as groups, including a separate treatment af the
largest commercial banks. The study ends with a brief comparison af the
Nordic countries. Also included is a discussion af changes that have occurred in
the banking environment, but the emphasis is on the effects of bank-specific
microeconomic factors on the rapid acceleration in the growth af bank lending
and on the heating up of competition for market share, which taok place after
lending rates were deregulated and foreign exchange regulations eased. The
miero factors examined are the change in banks' risk profile during the period
of rapid growth as well as the various incentives behind the growth and
competition for market share. To be sure, changes in the banking environment
and macroeeonomic developments have played a role in fomenting the banks'
profitability crisis in the beginning af the 1990s, but the main reasons for the
crisis can be found in the banks' strategic choices.
Tiivistelmä
Tässä selvityksessä tarkastellaan Suomen talletuspankkien kasvua vuosina
1980-1993. Selvityksessä tuodaan esiin taseiden kokonaiskasvu, luotonannon ja
yleisötalletusten kehitys sekä keskeisimmät taserakenteen muutokset. Tarkaste-
lun kohteena ovat ensiksi koko toimiala ja toiseksi liike-, säästö- ja osuuspankit
ryhminä sekä suurimmat liikepankit erikseen. Selvityksen lopussa on lyhyt ver-
tailu pohjoismaiden kesken. Selvityksessä pohditaan myös pankkien toiminta-
ympäristön muutosten ja erityisesti pankkikohtaisten, mikrotason, tekijöiden vai-
kutusta kasvun voimakkaaseen kiihtymiseen ja markkinaosuuskilpailun puhkea-
miseen antolainauksen korkosäätelyn purkamisen ja valuutansäännöstelyn lie-
ventämisen jälkeen. Mikrotason näkökohtina tuodaan esiin pankkien riskiprofii-
lin muuttuminen nopean kasvun aikana sekä erityyppiset kannustinvaikutukset
kasvun ja markkinaosuuskilpailun taustalla. Pankkien toimintaympäristän muu-
tokset ja suhdannekehitys ovat toki osaltaan vaikuttaneet toimialan kannatta-
vuuskriisin syntymiseen 1990-luvun alussa, mutta perimmäisinä syinä voidaan
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During the last three years the prafitability af Finnish deposit banks has
dropped sharply: the Finnish banking industry has had to face a severe crisis.
Banks showed operating losses already in 1991, but the actual plunge in
profitability took place in 1992 (see table 1). The main reason for the ·banks'
problems is generally considered ta be the unrestrained growth in lending that
fallowed the deregulatian af interest rates and capital mavements and led to a
sharp increase in credit losses. Banks aggregate credit losses were nearly 3 per
cent of their total assets in 1992. And in 1993 banks wrote off roughly the same
relative amaunt of their loan stock (see table 2). Moreover, the growth in credit
losses and non-perforrning assets has reduced banks' net interest income.
The banking crisis arose from a combination of cyclical and structural
factors. The cyclical factor was the deep economic recession, which worsened
the unexpectedly sharp decline in real estate and other asset prices, and hence
collateral values, and had a direct impact on banks' financial results via
nonmarketability allowances. 1n the case of real estate, it has been a matter of
correcting the "bubble", which resulted from a deluge af bank lending. The
recession has strengthened the structural impact of deregulation by, among other
things, spurring keener competition in the banking industry. Overshooting
during the phase of rapid expansian might have caused a counter reaction in
that banks have become overcautious in their lending. This, in concert with the
capital adequacy problems of the banks, could hamper the coming economic
upswing. 1n addition to deregulation the main structural factors have been
diversification, internation'alization and rapid technical progress among the
banks and other financial institutions as well as in the financial markets.
The aim af this study is first to document the growth of the deposit banks,
especially the growth af lending, and annual variation in growth during 1980-
1993. The period examined covers the entire process of liberalizing interest
rates and capital movements. Attention is also focused on the major changes in
the banks' balance sheet structure. In addition to this general overview, the
study highlights the primary differences among the various banking groups and
larger commercial banks. A second aim is to summarize the key changes in the
banking environment which prompted the expansion in the late 1980s. Third,
the study seeks ta evaluate the growth of the banks from the perspective af
microeconomic theory. Special emphasis is placed on changes in banks' risk
profile that took place following the deregulation and on the factors that fuelled
the growth. Our intent is to shed some light on the main features and to bring
together the various explanations of the growth. The foreign operations af banks
expanded sharply in the 1980s; the widening of these activities has caused
significant lasses. An in-depth evaluation af the fareign operations of banks,
hawever, remains, beyond the scope af this study. At the end af the study we
compare the grawth and credit write-affs af the Nordic banks.
1
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processing. This paper is published in Finnish as an article in Kansantaloudellinen aikakauskirja
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In the tables and figures given in the appendix, deposit banks include alI
domestic commercial banks as well as cooperative and savings 'banks. Foreign
subsidiaries and branch offices are thus excluded from the study. ln the analysis
by bank group, the central financial institutions of cooperative and savings
banks, OKO and SKOP respectively, are included in the commercial bank
group, unless otherwise indicated. The data are for parent hanks and are based
on financiaI-statements data published by Statistics Finland. Information for
1993 is obtained from the Financial Supervisian Authority. Bank lending
incIudes alI markka and foreign currency lending connected with cheque, giro
and other transactioris accounts, as well as bills af exchange, promissory notes,
interest-subsidized loans and loans to residents and nonresidents out of publie
funds. It does not include lending to the central govemment and other financial
institutions. Deposits include markka and foreign currency denominated
deposits from the domestic public, with the above-mentioned exclusions.
2.1 General Developments in the Banking Industry
In describing the grawth af banks, reference is generally made to balance sheet
growth and this is also the case here. It must be pointed out, however, that
changes in total assets are a poor indicator af changes in the volume af bank
output. They omit the output of services, such as payment services, which is not
reflected in balance sheet changes. Off-balance-sheet services are' likewise
disregarded. ,Another problem regards the cornposition of a production volume
deflator. Only with respect ta lending is the real markka amount an appropriate
measure of the volume af lending services, which are defined ta include the
assessment and comrnunication of the credit worthiness af enterprises and
private customers. The amount of loan services provided correlates with the size
of the laan, since an applicant for a larger loan must be evaluated and the laan
must be subsequently monitored more carefully. (See Suominen and Tarkka
(1991) for a more detailed look at the problems af defining and measuring the
output of bank operations).
The attached tables 3 and 4 give the annual real changes in banks' tatal
assets and lending between 1981-1993, while tables 5 and 6 present the
corresponding figures in naminal terms. Figures 1 and 2 depict the growth of
banks with respect ta changes in GDP and the rate af infiation. Figures 3-6
present the growth figures for the banks and bank groups detailed above. We
refer to these tables and figures in regard to the infarmation given in this and
the following sectian.
The combined balance sheet of Finnish deposit banks grew by almost six-
fold in nominal terms and three-foId in real terms from 1980 thraugh 1991,
after which it started ta falI sharply in 1992. The situation at the end of 1993 is
affected by the sale af the Savings Bank af Finland (SBF) in equal parts to four
of the banks' competitars, the cooperative banks, KOP, UBF and PSP (see
Nyberg and Vihriälä (1994) for more information). SBF was taken into state
ownership due to massive financial difficuIties. Since March 1993 the transfer
8of SBF's assets and liabilities to the buyer banks' balance sheets has been in
process. The transfer is to be completed by May 1994. The non-performing
assets of SBF are being transferred to the asset management company Arsenal
Ltd. These assets include loans, real estate and other assets amounting to FIM
30 billion, and guarantees of FIM 9 billion. The combined assets of deposit
banks declined further in 1993. The drop exceeded slightly that of 1992 due ta
a drastic faII in banks' loan stock.
Starting in 1982 banks balance sheets grew substantially faster than grass
domestic product: during 1982-1989 real asset growth was 3.7 times faster than
the real growth af the economy. The higher rate af infiation prevaiIing in the
early 1980s was reflected in nominal growth. However, it is noteworthy that
balance sheet growth was at a rather high level throughout the early 1980s. In
real terms, the grawth was greater in each year during 1982-1986 than in 1989,
when Finland was stilI in the midst af a baam. NanetheIess, the strongest
growth by far, approximately 23 per cent in real terms, took place after the
liberalization of the money markets in 1988.
The phasing out of interest rate and foreign exchange regulations gave
banks the apportunity ta meet the strong increase in credit demand spurred by
the economic boam and by the unleashing af pent-up demand for loans. The
most significant steps taken were the lifting af regulations on maximum and
average lending rates in August 1986 as well as the subsequent allowance af
the ilse of market rates of interest and the banks' own prime rates as reference
rates. Furthermore, the discontinuation in 1987 af the advance savings
requirements set by the Bank of Finland for housing and consumer loans made
it easier for households to borrow. Because af the large differential prevailing
between domestic and foreign interest rates, firms sought ta use foreign
currency loans ta an increasing extent after the deregulation in 1986 of long-
term (exceeding five years) foreign currency borrowing by manufacturers and
shipping companies. In 1987 the right to raise 10ng-term fareign currency loans
was extended ta ather industries.
At its peak in 1988, total lending by deposit banks grew in real terms by
almost 25 per cent. The demand for credit was boosted in 1988 in connection
with the financing of a large number of companyacquisitions prior to the
tightening of capital gains taxation in 1989. Borrowing in foreign currencies
intensified again in 1989, as the borrowing rights were extended to shorter, but
stilI exceeding one year, terms. This fina1 regu1ation was aboIished in 1990.
However, the imposition of a tax on foreign borrowing in January 1990 curbed
the demand for foreign currency Ioans to some extent.
Since the deregulation, lending has been sensitive to the state of the
econamy. Deposit banks' real credit stock decreased already in 1991 and in
1992 it shrank by approximately 5.5 per cent, as the economy went into a
recessian. The demand for credit was alsa dampened by the sharp rise in
market interest rates up until September 1992. Although market interest rates
have since fallen significantly, the aggregate loan stock af Finnish deposit
banks shrank by aver 14 per cent in real terms during 1993. The majar reasons
for the development are, in addition ta the stilI weak domestic economy, the
rapid pay-back af foreign currency denominated loans since markka was floated
in September 1992 and the rapid growth in credit Iosses.
Bank deposits did not keep pace with credit expansion. Banks cavered their
so-called funding gap by increasing their fareign liabilities and by tapping the
9money and bond markets. 1n the 1980s the funding link in Finland between
lending and deposits was gradually severed in step with the process of
deregulation. Previously, banks had been obliged to cover a funding gap
directly through the Bank af Finland or via the interbank call money market,
which was maintained by the central bank. Now that the stock af bank credit
has shrunk, the funding gap has narrowed considerably, practically completely
with respect to markka lending and deposits.
Suominen and Tarkka (1991) present indicatars af changes in production
volume also for bank services other than deposits and lending. According to
their caleulations, the growth in off-balance-sheet liabilities and securities
trading was appreciably faster than the expansion af lending in the later 1980s
(see Suominen and Tarkka (1991), table 11a). Furthermore, payment
intermediation via debit cards and automated teller machines increased rapidly
toward the end af the 1980s (see Suominen and Tarkka (1991), table 11b).
2.2 Differences between Bank Groups
1n the early 1980s the combined balance sheet of cammercial banks grew much
more rapidly than those af the loeal banks. 1n 1980-1985 the real rate af
grawth for commercial banks was about one and a half times faster than that
for cooperative banks and almost twice that for the savings banks. Savings
banks' balanee sheets grew the fastest in 1987-1989. At its peak in 1988 the
real growth far savings banks was 32 per cent. The cooperative banks followed
a more cautious growth strategy: their average balance sheet growth was less
than that of the commercial banks alsa in the latter half af the 1980s. The
difficulties faced by the savings banks are reflected in the shrinking of their
balance sheets in the beginning of the 1990s: during 1990-1992 their balance
sheet totaI feII at an annuaI rate of about 6 per cent in reaI terms. As a
consequenee of the sale af SBF, the savings bank seetar lost nearly two thirds
of its business valume, measured in terms af tatal assets.
KOP grew somewhat faster over the whole period under investigation than
did UBF. The difference in real grawth was about 1.5 percentage points in
favaur af KOP if the effect of the merger af STS Bank with KOP in 1992 is
exeluded. Publie deposits held with STS Bank were transferred ta KOP's books
already at the end af 1992, but the healthy part af STS Bank's loan stack was
transferred in early 1993. The problem loans, FIM 3.4 billion in tatal, remained
on the books af STS Bank, which was renamed Siltapankki. PSP grew
significantly more cautiously at the beginning af the 1980's than KOP and
UBF. 1ts steepest climb took place in the late 1980s when its balance sheet
grew 4 percentage points faster on average than that of KOP. The average rate
of growth for KOP and UBF was in faet faster in the first half af the 1980s
than in the latter half.
Of the larger commereial banks, the fastest balanee sheet growth in the
1980s was achieved by SKOP. During 1980-1985 its growth was on a par with
that of KOP, UBF and OKO, but in 1985-1990 its growth in nominal and real
terms was over 10 percentage points faster than that af OKO, which was.
number two in terms af growth during this periad, and almost 20 percentage
points faster than UBF and KOP. The swift expansion by SKOP has been
10followed by the down-sizing af its balance sheet in the 1990s, as the bank met
with severe financial difficulties: in 1993 SKOP's balance sheet was reduced by
roughly a third
2
• (See figure 4.)
The trends in lending in the different bank groups have been similar to
those for balance sheet growth. But lending growth was more pronounced in
1987 and 1988. The growth in lending by OKO during 1985-1990 was only
about 5 percentage points slower than that of SKOP. This was dueto the
especially sharp growth in foreign currency lending in 1990, when lending by
SKOP had already clearly slowed down. SKOP's credit stock soared in
1987-1989, at an annual rate of 40 per cent in real terms. The growth in
lending by KOP, UBF and PSP was considerably more moderate than by SKOP
and OKO. PSP increased its loan stock yet in 1992 when those of the other
large banks had started to shrink. During 1993 the fall in the aggregate loan
stock accelerated, amounting to a massive 14.1 per cent in real terms. (See
tables 4 and 6.)
3 Major Changes in Deposit Banks' Balance Sheet
Structure
3
3.1 Structure af Depasit Banks' Liabilities
After the severance of lending from deposit developments in the early 1980s,
with the deregulation af financial markets, banks have had ta find other funding
sources. Without these new forms of funding, the huge expansion of credit
would not have been possible.
The most significant structural change in funding has been the sharp
increase in foreign debt. The share of foreign liabilities on the balance sheet
totals af cammercial banks (excl. OKO and SKOP) grew from 17 per cent in
1980 to 41 per cent in 1992. The strongest increase in commercial banks'
foreign debt took place after 1986 when the foreign currency restrictions on
long-term foreign borrowing began to be phased out. Foreign funds were
channelled primarily into enterprises in the form af foreign curreney loans, but
the purely international business activities of eammercial banks, sueh as lending
to the fareign public and real estate investment, increased sharply. The increase
in fareign liabilities in the eommercial and savings bank groups (inel. OKO and
SKOP) has been considerably more modest. This is because it was not until the
late 1980s that the largest loeal (cooperative and savings) banks were allowed
to offer their elients fareign currency loans funded via their central financial
institutions. At the end of 1992 the foreign debt af the cooperative and savings
banks eonstituted about 15 per eent af their total liabilities and shareholders'
2 POT a comparison of SKOP and OKO, see Koskenkylä (1992).
3 The source far the information presented in this chapter is the monthly balance sheet survey af
the Finnish deposit banks conducted by the Bank of Finland. There are two recent studies by the
Bank of Finland evaluating in a more detailed fashian the changes in the balance sheet structure
af Finnish deposit banks: Silvonen (1994) and Jokinen and So1ttila (1994).
11equity. (The foreign debt of the savings banks relative to total liabilities and
equity has declined since 1990, when the ratio was about 24 per cent.)
Foreign debt has crowded out deposits af the publie in bank funding. The
share of deposits in the total funding af eammercial banks (excl. OKO and
SKOP) fell from about 58 per eent to 31 per eent in the period 1980-1992.
Among the loeal banks, deposits of the publie have remained a more important
source of funding, even though their share decreased in bath groups during this
period from about 80 per eent to 50 per cent. During 1986-1988 deposits by
the publie grew considerably faster in the laeal banks than in the commereial
banks, owing primarily to the steep rise in households' tax-exempt term
deposits. The savings banks ran into difficulties and lost depositors to the
eommercial and cooperative banks in the beginning of the 1990s. It would be
an exaggeration, however, to speak of a run on the savings banks. (See figure
11)
Money markets emerged in Finland in 1987 when the Bank of Finland
began open market operations and the cash reserve requirement was removed
from certificates of deposit. After this, the use of CDs in funding increased
rapidly. The share of CDs in total bank funding was only slightly over 10 per
cent in 1992, but CDs are the most important source of short-term bank
financing. The larger savings banks have issued their own CDs, whereas the
money market operations of eooperative banks have been intermediated by
OKO.
The share of bonds in total funding has increased since the beginning of
1991, when the adoption of the withholding tax on interest income inereased
investars' interest in bonds. The significance af bands in the funding of deposit
banks is nevertheless on the magnitude af only a few per eent. The undeveloped
state of the domestie secondary market, law fareign interest rates and the
longstanding tax-exempt status of depasits have hindered the ilse of
domestically issued bonds. Now also the lowered credit ratings of the Finnish
banks hamper banks' bond issues. The most important advantages to the banks
af bond funding are the lengthening af the maturity af funding and the
avoidance of opportunity interest eosts on required reserves. (See Silvonen
(1994) for a more detailed analysis.)
3.2 Structure af Depasit Banks' Assets
The most significant change as regards the asset side af the balance sheet was
the rapid growth in the relative share of foreign currency lending after the
1987-1989 phasing out of foreign exchange controls on long-term lending. The
share of foreign currency lending in the total loan stock almost doubled in
1987, to about 31 per cent. The growth in savings banks' fareign currency
lending toak place in 1990 and 1991. The independent savings banks have
granted anly a small amount af foreign currency loans and the cooperative
banks hardly any at alI. The foreign currency lending af these banking groups
has been handled directly by their own central banking institutions: foreign
currency lending by SKOP and OKO grew sharply in 1988-1990, levelling aff
at about 80 per cent af tatal lending in the early 1990s. The carresponding
share for KOP has been slightly over 50 per cent, for PSP slightly over 40 per
12cent. The significance of foreign currency lending for UBF declined appreciably
in 1992: the share of total lending fell by a third, to its 1989 level. Thus, UBF's
customers paid back their foreign currency loans ta a large extent already in
1992. During 1993 the relative share of foreign currency loans in UBF's total
stock did not- falI any further but instead increased slightly. 1n other banks the
relative share of foreign currency loans remained stable over 1992 and began ta
falI in 1993, quite sharply at KOP and PSP, by raughly 15 percentage 'points,
and more slawly at OKO and SKOP. (See figures 7 and 8.)
The share af deposit banks' foreign assets increased rapidly in the early
1980s, as banks opened branch offices abroad. Among the commercial banks
(excl. OKO and SKOP), the share of foreign assets peaked at 28 per cent in
1986, after which their importance has gradually diminished. Fareign assets
have had considerably less importance among the cooperative and savings
banks.
For alI deposit banks combined, the share of current assets in total assets
has increased sharply, from about 1 per cent in 1980 ta approximately 13 per
cent at the end af 1993 (see figure 9). Hawever, since the share af current
assets is stilI so srnall, one can say that in Finland the securitization of assets
has not yet occurred ta any apparent extent. The share of current assets in tatal
assets is appreciably lower for local banks than for commercial banks. Finnish
banks' investment assets have grown more slowly than current assets. Far the
deposit banks as a whoIe, the share af investment assets has roughly doubled
during the period under investigation. As is the case for current assets,
investment assets have been of minor importance for the loeal banks. Thus,
banks' securities trading and long-term investment in securities are concentrated
to a large extent in the commercial banks (see figure 9).
Changes with respect to other asset items have not been as great. The real
estate investments of deposit banks have been made primarily via subsidiaries,
80 that the increase in volume in the late 1980s is not evident in the changes
that have taken place in the parent banks' fixed capital (see figure 9).
4 Factors behind the Expansion
During the 1980s the most impartant structural factors shaping the banking and
finance industry were the liberalization af the industry and the liberalization af
capital movements, technical progress and financial innovation and
internationalizatian af the banks' corporate clientele. These factors created a
base for the expansion af banking activities. First, the rapid liberalization
allowed the banks ta take advantage of the economic boam in their campetition
for market share. The deregulation process has affected financial services
intermediatian, Lee the expansion af lending and deposit services, whiIe
technical progress has facilitated growth and efficiency in accounting and
payment services. Second, financial innovation, i.e. the diversification af
financial instruments, has accelerated the pace of financial intermediation.
Third, as the internationalization of domestic firms accelerated and their
financial needs increased, Finnish banks expanded their operations abroad in
arder ta serve domestic clients in their foreign operations and export activities
13and ta improve their efficiency in foreign exchange and securities trading
related ta company financing.
In addition ta these structural factors, the prevailing fiscal and manetary
policies as well as banking supervision and taxation have had an impact on the
magnitude af bank expansion and thus on the initiation af the banking crisis.
The main points can be summed up as follaws:
Fiscal policy was evidently not sufficiently stringent during the boom af
1987-1989, considering the expansionary impact of liberalization. The
extensive tax deductibility of interest on loans in combination with the high
level of income taxation made the real cost af credit rather low, which had a
significant impact on the sharp growth in household lending. The deductibility
of interest expenses was reduced in the beginning af 1989, which in hindsight
appears ta have been too late. As equity capital remained heavily taxed relative
ta debt, companies were induced ta ilse debt as the primary source af external
financing. The tax exemption of interest eamings on low-yielding bank deposits
constitutes a de facto subsidy to banks, which increases their capacity to lend in
times af heavy demand for credit. Maintenance of such taxation rules when the
economy was overheating can he regarded as the most serious policy error of
the period.
The Bank of Finland sought to curb the growth of lending through its
monetary policy. In 1987 the cash reserve requirement was raised and, more
importantly, in 1989 the banks were obliged ta make supplementary cash
reserve deposits linked to the growth in outstanding credit, thereby increasing
the east af bank lending. This had the effect af curbing the growth af lending at
most banks, but some savings banks chose ta pay the new penal rates rather
than to restrain credit expansion. However, borrowing in foreign currencies
continued to increase as the regulatians were relaxed. Finally, in 1989 the base
rate was raised and the markka was revalued by 4 per cent. These actions can
be criticized as being insufficient ar coming too late, but in the overheated
conditions af 1988 and 1989 monetary policy was quite limited in its ability to
affect bank lending.
The banking supervision authorities did not have sufficient resources nar
operative procedures for a deregulated environment. On the other hand, the
warnings given by the authorities felI on deaf ears during the peak growth
period. Furthermore, the law at that time did not provide adequate means far
curbing the growth af lending.
The above-mentioned extemal factors have clearly promoted the banks'
grawth and credit expansion, but the behaviour af the banks must be analyzed
mare closely from the standpoint of risk management and pricing as well as
competitive factors. These micro-Ievel factors can be considered as fundamental
reasons and motives behind the growth. The lending decisions were made by
the banks, not by publie authorities.
145 Miero Aspeets af Bank Growth
5.1 Expansion of Activities and Change in Risk Profile
In an industry that has operated for a long time in a regulated environment,
rapid liberalization is a form of external shock which causes changes in the
pricing and other operative strategies of firms in the industry. The change in the
banking industry can be expected to be especially profound since regulation has
limited competition by preventing price competition, favoured cartel-type
behaviour and limited the growth of bank assets, so that regulation may have
led to credit rationing in case of some customers. By limiting competition, the
regulations safeguarded the profitability of the industry and, one could say,
raised costs through managerial expense preference behaviour. Under conditions
af regulation, when price competition is impeded, banks strive to compete in
the quality of services by increasing the number of bank service outlets
(branches and ATMs) and producing technically adept services. This so-calIed
quality competition leads to a higher leveI of distribution capacity and banking
technology than would result under efficient price competition (see e.g. Neven
(1990) and Vesala (1993».
DereguIation can be expected ta increase price competition and bank
lending, if there has previously been actual credit rationing, Le. if there has
been unsatisfied demand for credit. The banks' on-balance-sheet risk could be
increased in the process because of the following considerations (see e.g.
LIewellyn (1992) and White (1992»:
(a) Banks consciously adjust their behaviour toward less risk averseness by
aiming at balance sheet growth and market share (in the short run) instead of
profitability. In connection with raising the risk profile, it is important that risks
be priced correctly, Le. that they be included in the interest margins.
(b) When alI banks simultaneously expand their operations to a significant
extent, lending becomes mare risky, as for example, when borrowers' financial
structures become more Ieveraged (systemic effect).
(c) Banks cannot gauge their risks correctly when they are expanding into
new areas of activity.
(d) If growth in lending is concentrated on certain sectors, the risk af the
overall laan portfolio increases.
(e) When lending expands rapidly, bank resources become stretched to thin
to adequately evaluate their laan customers.
(1) As the level of interest rates rises, the risk entailed in the financing of
investment projects increases as low-yielding but less risky projects are not
sufficiently profitable (adverse selection effect).
As the Finnish depasit banks expanded, the risks associated with lending
evidently increased for alI of the above reasons. There were, af course,
differences between individual banks: for example, excessive concentration on
lending led to the downfall of SKOP. Generally speaking, the clase ties in
Finland between the banks and the manufacturing industry have increased
portfolio risk because of the excessive concentration af the credit risk exposure.
Banks paid insufficient attention to the vaIue and quality of collateral, and the
interest margins were too low, due to competition between banks for loan
15market share. With the benefit af hindsight, it is clear that margins were
inadequate in light af the growing risk. Hence, banks severely underpriced their
credit risks.
Banks did not place sufficient attention on the evaluation af credit risk:
especially in the case af foreign currency lending, the banks were evidently
insufficiently prepared for the realization af currency risk as credit risk in a
situation where client firms ran into difficulties with their unhedged foreign
currency loans when the markka was sharply devaluated (see Currie (1993»).
The reasons for the shortcomings in the pricing of risk include the inexperience
af the personnel and inadequate risk evaluation, monitoring and management
systems. In addition, there was a lack af interest rate competitian for depasits
up until 1991 stemming from the tax relief law. With the aid of cross subsidies,
lending rates were kept low in order ta increase market share and attract new
depositors. The costs of this type of product packaging were thus covered in the
interest margins on deposits. 1ndeed, the banks' net interest income has come
almost completely from the deposit markets (see Silvonen (1994)). Furthermore,
the realizatian af interest rate risk has put a strain on the profitability of
lending, especially as the interest rates on 10ans linked to the base rate remained
below market rates of interest until the end of 1992. Banks' profitability was
strained when a grawing partion of its funding was linked ta market interest
rates. The pricing af risk has been impeded by the lack af an independent credit
rating agency in Finland.
The banks and barrawers acted out af a widespread tmst in favourable
economic developments, which later proved to be overoptimistic. Furthermore,
borrowers overestimated their ability to service their debts. 1n particular, with
respect ta foreign currency lending, there was a failure to recognize the hidden
devaluation risk indicated by the large interest rate differential.
On the basis of points (a)-(f) it could be said that the fastest growing
banks have incurred the greatest 10sses. Figure 10 presents the correlations
between the grawth in lending in the latter half of the 1980s and the loan write-
offs that followed in the early 1990s. In this connection, the lag structure af the
loan write-affs is not analyzed in detail but rather the time periods used reflect
cyclical movements. In these figures, in contrast with other parts of this study,
OKO and SKOP been included with the cooperative and savings banks. Owing
to the savings banks, the positive correlation shows up clearly. Realized credit
losses relative ta lending growth have been large for UBF and KOP campared
to the cooperative banks and PSP. It is noteworthy that interbank differences in
the procedure for writing off laans affects the situation. The cooperative bank
group has been much slower ta write aff loans. (See also table 2.)
5.2 Growth Catalysts
Banks were eager ta expand their operations after the deregulation, as the
capacity created during the period af regulation (in quality competition) now
constituted a burden. Under conditions af price competition, the capacity built
up during the period af regulation became overcapacity, and the previous level
of costs per unit could no longer be maintained in the eompetitive environment
af deregulated markets. The banks did in faet expand withaut increasing their
16branch office capacity, but the number of personnel grew sharply as the
diversification af banking activities required more and better educated
personnel.
A more significant incentive for the banks' credit expansion and increased
credit risk taking during the boom of the late 1980s than the incentive coming
from the cost side was conceivably the so-called moral hazard problem. The
depositors and banks in Finland have regarded it as very likely that the
government would support banks running into difficulties and prevent
bankruptcies, as the Finnish banking system is very concentrated and banks
hold a key position in the Finnish financial markets. This is known as the too-
large-to-fail phenomenon. Thus, the repercussions of a failure of even one large
bank for the other sectors of the economy would be great and would as a
consequence endanger the entire banking system. A full deposit guarantee has
safeguarded the funds of depositors, so that they have not felt a great need to
place their' funds in well managed, lower risk banks. The belief in uniimited
support for troubled banks increases banks risk-taking propensity, since under
favourable canditions (the eontinuation af the economie boom and rise in asset
priees) the projects financed by the banks would be profitable to the banks, but
in the worse case the risks would be shifted to the government, i.e. to the
taxpayers. Under these conditions, even the unbridled growth in lending cannot
be regarded as completely irrational or short-sighted behaviour.
5.3 Factors behind the Outbreak af Competition for
Market Share
Setting growth and market share above the profitability objective can be
explained by management preferences, e.g. status promotion, which conflict
with the aims af owners. In this case the banks' owners can also be blamed for
neglect of proper monitoring af management. With hindsight, we see that the
growth strategy was implemented at the branch office level only "tao well"
through intemal incentive schemes. In some cases, even executives' salaries
were tied to growth.
The eonflict af interest between management and awners could be one
reason for the heating af eompetition for market share, but there is a deeper
question ta raise: how could growth in market shares be of benefit ta the
banks? If a bank can achieve higher profits in the future by increasing its
market share, this is in the interest af the owners, even if profitability suffers in
the short run. Bank customers are not disposed to changing banks, as
"switching costs" are signifieant and the banks strive to bind customers by
contractual means (see e.g. Vives (1991). This also means that the banks have
de facto market power over their clients and that their future profits depend on
their eUITent market share. Deregulation during the economic upswing increased
the size af the market, so that the competition for market share can be regarded
as competition for new clients. The objective of the banks was evidently to ilse
their newly acquired market power to their advantage later on. The credit
expansion, however, was so massive that it can hardly be fully explained by the
above argument. Moral hazard in particular seems to have played a significant
role.
17The banks' growth strategy is often explained by the benefits af large-scale
ar joint production in that increasing output or offering new services lower the
unit costs af producing bank services. In the econometric literature there is a
braad consensus that the economies or diseconomies of scale are very smali,
nor is there strong evidence af econamies to be gained through joint productian
(see Vesala (1993) for a review of the literature). On the contrary, the efficient
ilse af resources has been found ta be much more significant than bank size in
determining unit costs. Cost efficient (competitive) banks are in fact faund in
alI size categories (see Kuussaari (1993)). Hence, in light of econometric
studies, the chief objective for bank growth, as for mergers, is to increase
market power, and cost pressure cannot be regarded as a very significant factor
behind grawth.
6 Nordic Comparison of Bank Growth and Credit
Losses
This section focuses on the growth af Nordic deposit banks, in terms af bath
total assets and lending. It covers parent banks over the period 1981-1993.
The mast rapid growth in bank balance sheets occurred in the early 1980s
in Denmark (figures 12). Financial markets there were liberalized before those
of the other Nordic countries. The next fastest growth has been in Finland,
especially during 1986-1989. In alI the Nordic countries, bank balance sheets
have shrunk significantly in the early 1990s.
The fastest growth in lending clearly occurred in Norway and Denmark in
the early 1980s (figure 13). In the latter half of the 1980s loans outstanding
increased most rapidly in Sweden and Finland. Figures 12 and 13 indicate that
Finland, compared ta the other Nordic countries, experienced particularly rapid
growth in balance sheets but not in lending.
Figure 14 presents the ratia of bank assets to GDP over the period 1981-
1993. Finland's ratio has clear1y risen to the top spot among the Nordic
countries since 1991, due not only to faster balancesheet growth than in the
other Nordic countries but also ta the falI in Finnish GDP. Denmark's
asset/GDP ratia has been also been fairly high. The balance sheets of Danish
banks include a sizable amount of govemment bonds in current and investment
assets. The ratio of loans to GDP is now likewise clearly highest in Finland
(figure 15). The ratia has been the next highest in Norway in the mid-1980s.
The Swedish ratio is surprisingly low, even though bank lending grew very
rapidly in Sweden in the latter half af the 1980s.
Figure 16 gives a comparison of the average growth rates for loan stock
and of the ratios af credit write-offs to tota1 assets. Since credit losses follow
lending growth with a lag, figure 16 gives growth figures for outstanding loans
for 1985-1990 and credit write-offs for 1991-1992. Figure 16 does not
completely suppart the hypothesis that the faster the grawth in lending, the
greater the relative credit losses. The lag depicted in figure 16 is rather
arbitrary, since the actual lag between lending and credit losses is not known
with any precision. Furthermore, there are differences across the Nordic
countries in the way Ioans are written off. Norwegian banks started provisioning
18for discretionary (probable) credit losses before the other Nardic countries (see
Koskenkylä - Pensala (1992)).
Figure 17 examines relative net interest ineome in the Nordic deposit
banks. The ratio of net interest income to assets has been substantially lower in
Finland than in the other Nardic eountries and it has displayed a declining
trend. The faster growth in balance sheets and lending vis-a-vis the ather
Nordic countries in the latter half af the 1980s has led to a continued eroSian af
relative net interest incame. Loans and other investments have been granted ta
clients that have been unable to fuIfil their obligations to the banks..
The banks' relative credit write-offs are examined in figure 18. The ratio af
write-offs to assets has climbed the highest in Sweden since 1991. It has risen
signifieantly alsa in Finland and Denmark in 1991 and 1992. In NOfW'ay the
relative eredit losses fell aIready in 1992; in alI the other Nordie eountries the
decline oceurred last year.
In summary, it can be stated that the rates of growth in balance sheets and
lending were the fastest in Norway and Denrnark, already in the first half ef the
1980s, i.e. considerably before the other Nordie countries. Balance sheet and
lending growth were subsequently faster in Finland than in Sweden, even
though credit write-offs relative to total assets have been higher in Sweden than
in Finland. The differenee is partly attributable to the faet that the writing-eff of
credit losses has been more liberal in Sweden than in Finland.
7 Conclusions
By far the fastest growth for Finnish banks took place immediately after the
phasing out of some of the majar interest and foreign exchange restrictions in
1988. In 1989, even while the Finnish economy was booming, the grawth of
banks had already slowed down. Lending growth hit a very sharp peak: in 1988
it grew considerably faster than balance sheets. The savings bank group grew
the fastest of alI groups in the late 1980s, when the cooperative banks and PSP
also recorded their fastest growth. The grawth af UBF and KOP, on the ather
hand, was much more even during the 1980s. The most important change in the
lending structure for alI the banks has been the considerable growth in the share
of fareign currency lending in total lending subsequent to the deregulatian af
long-term foreign currency 10ans. The share of foreign currency loans in
aggregate bank lending has nevertheless fallen significantly since its peak in
1992, as banks customers have strived to reduce their exchange risk exposure
since the flaating af the markka.
The strong credit expansion necessitated the diversification of funding. The
most important structural ehanges were the increasing share af foreign debt and
the rapid increase in the use af CDs after the emergence of the money market.
Other changes have been minor.
The faetors cited behind the expansion include structural factors, rapid
liberalization, technical progress and internationalization as well as rebust
growth in laan demand during the economic upswing. The gavernment's
biggest mistake was perhaps its maintenance af tax regulations that eneouraged
enterprises and households ta borrow. 1n general terms, ecanomic policy was
19too loose in light of the booming economy. This was alI due to the strong belief
in the favourable course of the economy.
The credit expansion nevertheless had its roots in the strategic choices of
the banks, whereby growth and market share became the conscious objectives.
The failure of this st~ategy Ied to a profitability crisis owing ta deficiencies in
the pricing of credit risk, undeveloped risk analysis and even neglect in a
situation where the lending risks were growing appreciably. Cost pressures,
internal salary and ather incentive schemes, and especially expectations abaut
publie suppart in the event af a possible crisis situatian served as catalysts to
growth.
The growth in banks' balance sheets and lending in Denmark and Norway
took place in the early 1980s, earlier than in Finland and Sweden. Owing
largely to the earlier start of financial market deregulation in Denmark and the
earlier timing of the boom in Norway, bank growth was most rapid inFinland
in 1987 and 1988 and in Sweden in 1989 and 1990. The growth in balance
sheets and lending relative to gross domestic product was clearly fastest in
Finland from the mid-1980s on: monetary flows increased more in Finland in
relation to the real economy. 1n 1990, 1991 and 1992 the banks' credit write-
offs relative to total assets were substantially higher in Sweden than in Finland.
Swedish banks have evidently opted to write off credit losses at an earlier stage.
Due to vigorous export growth, the macroeconomic outlook has improved
although many important domestic sectors still remain depressed. Domestic
demand is expected to remain weak in 1994, although investments should pick
up as output pushes against capacity constraints in the export manufacturing
sector. Interest rates have declined considerably since the floating ef the
markka, and share prices rose very rapidly in 1993, generating more demand for
credit. Banks' results should improve as banks have written off a substantial
portion of their problem loans. This, together with the faII in market interest
rates, should improve banks net interest income. AlI in alI, the improvement in
the banks' financial position depends crucially on future macroeconomic
developments, which, according to current forecasts, should be quite favourable,
especially from 1995 enwards.
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21Table 1. Deposit Banks: Operating Profit (= Profit before Appropriations and Taxes) I Total Assets, per cent
31.12.19xx
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Commercial banks 0.66 0.91 0.89 0.78 0.69 0.97 0.74 0.78 0.99 0.42 0.38 -0.71 -1.95 -1.73
Cooperative banks 0.62 0.65 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.70 0.62 0.67 0.85 0.56 0.74 0.74 0.03 -1.58
Savings banks 0.55 0.62 0.59 0.47 0.38 0.56 0.59 0.66 1.89 0.44 0.54 -0.42 -9.53 -10.85
Deposit banks 0.63 0.81 0.80 0.70 0.62 0.86 0.70 0.75 1.12 0.45 0.46 -0.46 -2.82 -2.25
KOP 0.80 0.89 0.81 0.56 0.79 0.78 0.58 0.81 0.79 0.70 0.43 -1.20 -2.17 -1.73
UBF 0.61 1.14 1.01 0.79 0.70 1.12 0.88 0.90 0.85 0.59 0.48 -0.06 -1.60 -1.61
OKO 0.37 0.66 0.90 0.55 0.75 1.09 0.90 0.76 0.77 0.27 0.52 0.54 0.11 0.13
SKOP 0.49 0.50 0.57 0.43 0.81 1.18 0.74 0.93 1.36 0.24 -0.19 -3.02 -7.42 -5.82
PSP 0.76 0.89 0.97 1.47 0.53 0.65 0.66 0.44 0.73 -0.15 0.47 -0.26 -0.64 -0.31
Averages
80-90 80-85 85-90 90-93
0.75 0.82 0.71 -1.00
0.67 0.66 0.69 -0.02
0.66 0.53 0.78 -5.06
0.72 0.74 0.72 -1.27
0.72 0.77 0.68 -1.17
0.83 0.90 0.81 -0.70
0.68 0.72 0.72 0.32
0.64 0.66 0.71 -4.11
0.67 0.88 0.47 -0.19
Table 2. Deposit Banks: Credit Write"offs / TotaI Assets, per cent
31.12.19xx
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Commercial banks 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.21 0.29 0.31 0.93 2.32 2.37
Cooperative banks 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.38 1.10 2.09
Savings banks 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.34 0.95 6.98 7.23
Deposit banks 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.29 0.86 2.87 2.61
KOP 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.26 0.37 0.88 2.55 2.13
UBF 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.22 0.37 0.46 0.54 0.75 2.03 2.49
OKO 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.18 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.25 0.15 0.32 0.50 0.57
SKOP 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.25 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.22 0.15 2.65 5.92 4.74
PSP 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.13 0.61 1.71 1.59
Averages
80-90 80-85 85-90 90-93
0.12 0.05 0.18 1.48
0.08 0.02 0.12 0.94
0.08 0.02 0.13 3.87
0.11 0.04 0.16 1.66
0.12 0.05 0.20 1.48
0.17 0.03 0.29 1.45
0.11 0.09 0.12 0.38
0.11 0.09 0.12 3.37
0.06 0.04 0.07 1.01Table 3. Deposit Banks: Real Growth in Balance Sheets, per cent, 1980=100
Annual growth
80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93
Commercial banks 2.79 13.75 10.40 19.82 11.40 22.81 12.75 20.84 9.25 3.04 1.46 -4.35 2.12
Cooperative banks 5.06 7.05 7.99 7.91 10.49 11.91 12.90 24.05 6.64 2.63 2.43 2.42 8.85
Savings banks 2.72 7.03 6.95 7.28 8.12 10.27 15.29 31.91 14.96 -5.30 -5.37 -7.41 -63.17
Deposit banks 3.17 11.26 9.34 15.52 10.69 19.02 13.16 23.07 9.85 1.49 0.46 -4.83 -5.76
KOP 0.78 15.65 11.93 25.77 13.63 22.00 12.69 21.48 -1.97 2.61 -8.83 9.18 7.97
UBF 1.28 16.34 10.93 13.06 13.92 38.83 7.58 11.46 6.35 -9.73 3.97 2.03 3.47
OKO 5.66 10.89 16.64 14.59 7.11 19.41 16.07 42.60 18.42 -3.11 -1.54 9.07 19.83
SKOP 7.39 8.23 20.68 17.63 9.13 31.80 34.16 44.43 35.19 0.08 -13.29 -26.83 -35.27
PSP 6.32 10.37 1.92 23.07 7.71 32.13 9.12 12.94 3.45 17.65 6.28 -2.02 14.72
l\verage growth
80-90 80-85 85-90 90-93
12.69 11.63 13.74 -0.26
9.66 7.70 11.62 4.57
9.92 6.42 13.43 -25.32
11.66 10.00 13.32 -3.38
12.46 13.55 11.36 2.77
11.00 11.11 10.90 3.16
14.83 10.98 18.68 9.12
20.87 12.61 29.13 -25.13
12.47 9.88 15.06 6.33
Table 4. Deposit Banks: Real Growth in Lending, per cent, 1980=100
Annual growth
80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93
Commercial banks 0.69 8.70 6.72 12.09 18.60 12.26 11.32 24.22 12.97 9.29 -1.05 -6.90 -1.12
Cooperative banks 6.88 7.37 6.82 6.54. 9.05 10.80 14.01 22.66 5.02 1.97 1.02 -2.37 9.32
Savings banks 2.92 6.48 5.19 4.34 7.52 10.90 16.31 28.64 13.84 -4.05 -8.12 -12.23 -76.93
Deposit banks 2.47 7.90 6.39 9.14 14.19 11.67 12.91 24.84 11.61 5.00 -2.10 -5.49 -14.10
KOP -0.34 7.97 16.37 18.71 18.63 17.50 1.15 26.69 8.41 1.91 -1.61 -6.83 8.41
UBF -0.68 17.15 2.98 8.61 25.95 23.99 9.29 20.66 6.22 -3.16 0.82 -3.21 3.58
OKO 13.73 -2.02 20.64 21.28 9.02 11.11 16.42 30.37 34.56 37.37 -4.62 1.57 -23.51
SKOP 8.95 9.50 3.90 2.14 10.44 23.59 39.29 40.55 40.68 12.81 -11.58 -28.18 -35.87
PSP 2.59 5.75 0.24 3.81 9.94 13.18 10.27 26.00 -0.16 15.98 2.14 4.52 11.42
Average growth
80-90 80-85 85-90 90-93
11.69 9.36 14.01 -3.02
9.11 7.33 10.89 2.65
9.21 5.29 13.13 -32.43
10.61 8.02 13.21 -7.23
11.70 12.27 11.13 -0.01
11.10 10.80 11.40 0.40
19.25 12.53 25.97 -8.85
19.19 6.99 31.38 -25.21
8.76 4.47 13.05 6.02Table 5. Deposit Banks: Nominal Growth in Balance Sheets, per cent
Annual growth
80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93
Commcrcial banks 15.11 24.65 19.65 28.28 17.19 26.42 17.38 26.99 16.45 9.32 5.65 -1.86 4.23
Cooperative banks 17.65 17.30 17.03 15.53 16.24 15.20 17.54 30.36 13.66 8.89 6.66 5.09 11.10
Savings banks 15.03 17.28 15.91 14.86 13.74 13.51 20.02 38.62 22.54 0.47 -1.47 -5.00 -62.40
Deposit banks 15.53 21.92 18.50 23.68 16.44 22.52 17.82 29.33 17.09 7.67 4.60 -2.35 -3.81
KOP 12.85 26.72 21.30 34.65 19.54 25.58 17.32 27.65 4.49 8.86 -5.08 12.02 10.20
UBF 13.42 27.49 20.22 21.04 19.84 42.91 12.00 17.13 13.36 -4.23 8.25 4.68 5.62
OKO 18.32 21.51 26.41 22.68 12.67 22.92 20.84 49.85 26.23 2.79 2.52 11.90 22.32
SKOP 20.26 18.60 30.79 25.94 14.80 35.67 39.67 51.77 44.10 6.17 -9.72 -24.93 -33.93
PSP 19.06 20.94 10.46 31.76 13.31 36.02 13.60 18.69 10.27 24.82 10.66 0.53 17.10
i\verage grovvth
80-90 80-85 85-90 90-93
20.14 20.97 19.31 2.67
16.94 16.75 17.13 7.62
17.20 15.36 19.03 -22.96
19.05 19.21 18.88 -0.52
19.90 23.01 16.78 5.72
18.32 20.40 16.23 6.19
22.42 20.32 24.53 12.25
28.78 22.08 35.48 -22.86
19.89 19.11 20.68 9.43
Table 6. Deposit Banks: Nominal Growth in Lending, per cent
Annual growth
80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 89-90 90-91 91-92 92-93
Commercial banks 12.76 19.11 15.66 20.01 24.76 15.56 15.89 30.54 20.41 15.94 3.03 -4.47 0.93
Cooperative banks 19.68 17.66 15.77 14.06 14.72 14.06 18.69 28.89 11.94 8.18 5.18 0.17 11.59
Savings banks 15.25 16.68 14.00 11.71 13.11 14.16 21.09 35.19 21.34 1.79 -4.33 -9.95 -76.45
Deposit banks 14.75 18.24 15.30 16.85 20.12 14.96 17.55 31.19 18.96 11.40 1.93 -3.03 -12.32
KOP 11.61 18.31 26.12 27.10 24.79 20.95 5.30 33.13 15.56 8.11 2.44 -4.41 10.66
SYP 11.22 28.37 11.61 16.28 32.49 27.63 13.79 26.79 13.21 2.74 4.97 -0.69 5.73
OKO 27.36 7.36 30.75 29.85 14.68 14.37 21.20 37.00 43.43 45.74 -0.69 4.21 -21.93
SKOP 22.01 19.99 12.60 9.35 16.18 27.23 45.02 47.70 49.94 19.68 -7.94 -26.31 -34.54
PSP 14.88 15.88 8.63 11.15 15.65 16.51 14.80 32.40 6.42 23.05 6.35 7.24 13.73
i\verage grovvth
80-90 80-85 85-90 90-93
19.06 18.46 19.67 -0.17
16.36 16.38 16.35 5.64
16.43 14.15 18.72 -30.24
17.93 17.05 18.81 -4.48
19.10 21.58 16.61 2.90
18.41 19.99 16.83 3.34
27.17 22.00 32.35 -6.13
26.97 16.03 37.91 -22.93
15.94 13.24 18.64 9.10Figure 1.
Figure 2.
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